(1) There is a lot of angst on Indian side on Galwan confrontation. But let us coldly look at the scene. All GOI's work under the consequence of asinine geostrategic vision of Nehru which worked out on ground mostly as per British interests for central Asia, Gulf, SE Asia.
(2) Every GOI since Nehru has to deal with the difficulty of a two-front war situation inherited from Nehru's near-criminal (on geostrategic terms) support for China in 1950's and not forestalling fall of Tibet to Mao. In early cold war phase this wd hv been feasible(not later)
(3) All the BJP govs appear to have decided on tackling the western front first while trying to keep the eastern front inactive. It makes sense because on the surface Pak is a more easily neutralized, while China needs greater preparation.
(4) China also realizes this, and with increased Indian pressure on Pak, China is scared its western handle on India& Gulf through Pak is getting squeezed out. With the western shifting of ISIS scum into north AFG, China knows it cant control Pak on jihadi push towards India.
(5) This has the risk for China, that as and when AFPAK jihadi base rushes towards India, India will have all justifications to hit back on Pak and as a result may regain control of the thin strip of land required to block PLA access and supply route to Pak jihad.
(6) China has mounted this provocation simply to keep the threat of a two-front war on India to relieve the pressure on Pak. Given its not talking that much directly to its own ppl - it implies the conflict is of value to muzzle dissent within party on "unity b4 external threat".
(7) From Indian side, the greatest obstacle is perhaps an indecision or hesitation on what the real long term objective of India should be on the jihadi occupied territory known as Pakistan and Han-occupied Tibet. To absorb, "bufferize", split, or not do anything.
(8) There is I suspect also a problem of how intel interacts with gov. The intel role in the buildup to 1962 is rather murky. Without internal mudslinging, there cd be issues on how intel fed perspectives to gov that affects in turn imaginations or assessments of enemy strength.
(9) crucial estimates of Chinese weaknesses in 1960-62 were "missed" (for example air weakness). There needs to be a reassessment of intel role, and even a counter-intel role to check that intel is not itself being influenced by interfaces (interfacing with "others" is vital)
(10) that have their own agenda in protecting Chinese territorial presence in order to protect Pak. Early continuity of Brit intel links to Indian intel, post indep, and subsequent protection of Pak interests (even BD ntervention was gradually turned around in favour of jihad)
(11) needs to be kept in mind as a possibility. What the Galwan encounter will do, is a reassessment in all the above. GOI will be forced to start thinking long term on Tibet, prepare for a two-front war (proved now as inevitable if jihad from western front is to be crushed)
(12) neither overestimate (which worked out in Chinese and Brit-interests and therefore Pak-jihad interests), nor underestimate China's capabilities or its strategic and tactical vision. We must salute the soldiers who attained "veergati". But a lot of positives from now on.
(13) The Chinese communist party is on a downward slope, and China should not be blown up out of proportions. In many senses China will prove to be as much a "paper tiger" as Maoists often dub their enemies as. Its a matter of cold calculation and not emotional flagellation.
