Chinese occupation of #xinjiang - a model imported from #Tibet - and how the PRC will implement it in #Taiwan to quell a potential insurgency. A 🧵
1/ Chinese operations in Xinjiang is a very presence heavy approach - 三æ¥ä¸€å²—，五æ¥ä¸€å“¨ - "3 steps a post, 5 steps a whistle" - a team of PAP and local cops are visible at every corner
2/ This style of locking down a large urban area was first employed in Lhasa after 2008 and then again in Urumqi in 2009.
3/ It's also important to note that when people think of Urumqi, they think it looks like this - that is false. This is the old town district of Kashgar:
4/ This is what Urumqi actually looks like - population 3.5 million spread across a municipal area of 14,000 sq km
5/ In comparison, here is Taipei - population 2.6 million spread across a municipal area of 271 sq km
6/ Additionally, both Xinjiang and Taiwan have a similar population size: 23-25 million people
7/ The main difference between the two are their total area size. Across the vast expanse of Xinjiang, the PAP created and then fought an active insurgency from 2009 to 2012 following the 2009 Urumqi riots.
8/ From 2012 onward, the PAP began conducting a total security lockdown of Xinjiang, and aimed to do so by fundamentally rewiring the entire society via the concentration camps/detainment centers/vocational schools
9/ The camps exist for two primary purposes in Xinjiang - discrediting potential insurgents and sinicization of the rural Uyghur population.
10/ In a Taiwan scenario, the camps will be used primarily for the former - discrediting potential insurgents. The process works like this:
11/ Insurgencies are notoriously difficult to sustain because of the amount of privation insurgents must suffer - membership is not readily conferred and relies heavily upon trust.
12/ A detainee's cell, no matter how awful, will still have certain accommodations that are luxuries compared to similar living conditions for an insurgent.
13/ A note on the appearances of the camps - many of them do indeed model themselves after schools, and their cells are modeled after college dorms. For reference, this is what a school looks like in China
14/ Within the detention centers, confessions and actionable intel are rewarded with slightly improved conditions - e.g better food, fewer inspections, maybe even a book to read.
15/ For our detained inmate seeking to join an insurgency, no matter how awful his conditions are, he's still living in luxury compared to an insurgent. This is key.
16/ Potential insurgent organizations will view anyone who has confessed to the PRC authorities as a collaborator incapable of enduring the life of insurgency. i.e. untrustworthy
17/ This was the lesson that the PLA learned during its own insurgency years. Those who were detained by the KMT and released--often after torture--were never truly welcomed back into the fold.
18/ At the heart of this operation is the PAP. Despite its name, the PAP is a military force that operates the WZ-551 as its primary armored vehicle, making them similar in armament as a PLA Medium CABN
19/ The PAP also trains heavily in urban combat via their special police units, and each large municipality has their own SPU.
19/ Once initial shore operations are concluded by the PLA, it is expected that urban operations be handed over to the PAP.
20/ In recent years, the PAP has been greatly expanding their use of small unmanned platforms to support their operations.
21/ When conducting COIN operations, the PAP's primary method is to utilize the same operations codified by Lin Biao in his COIN op against the Manchurian honghuzi
22/ A relentless pursuit of the insurgents with light infantry. This was--once again--built on the PLA's own insurgency experience: constant retreats grinds down morale, and an inability to create a safe rear area makes it difficult to sustain insurgency.
23/ Captured insurgent will then be transferred to one the many detainment centers the KMT operated on Taiwan during the white terror period, where they will be asked to write confessions.
24/ Collaborators for any PRC occupation of Taiwan will primarily come from the Taiwanese aboriginal population. This is similar to Xinjiang, where majority of the police units are staffed by Uyghurs
25/ The most persecuted class of local Taiwanese will be Benshengren history and civic teachers. The PRC views primary education as the best way to shape national unity and identity.
26/ Taiwan's geography may seem suitable for an insurgency, but much of its mountainous regions are inaccessible, and the island nature of Taiwan itself makes it difficult to supply insurgents as well, especially if the PLAN and PLARF enacts a blockade.
27/ Majority of Taiwan's ports face the mainland, and there are only a few narrow roads connecting the eastern and western coasts.
28/ This makes an insurgency even more difficult to sustain, as any materiel delivered via the eastern shore will be liable to be interdicted on those roads.
29/ Moreover, even normal police forces in China has had experience quickly locking down megacities throughout the COVID crisis and dealing with citizens defying lockdown protocols.
30/ In a Taiwan scenario, PAP forces can and will be surged with police from other Chinese cities to bolster occupation manpower. Detainment camps will be repurposed to discredit any would be insurgents.
